Sunshine Act Meeting
A Notice by the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board on 07/12/2013
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:
The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) will convene a public meeting on Thursday, July 25, 2013, starting at 9:30 a.m. EDT at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Horizon Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20004. Between 9:30 a.m. and 12:15 p.m., the Board will consider and vote on the status designations of the following three recommendations issued by the CSB to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration: (1) 2001-05-I-DE-1 (revision of Process Safety Management standard to clarify coverage of atmospheric storage tanks connected to process vessels); (2) 2005-04-I-TX-9 (revision of Process Safety Management standard to require management of change reviews for certain organizational changes); and (3) 2010-07-I-CT-1 (issuance of a general industry and construction standards for fuel gas safety).
Beginning at 1:30 p.m. EDT, the Board will consider and vote on the status designations of four recommendations related to the issuance of a general industry standard for combustible dusts as follows (1) 2006-1-H-R1 (from Combustible Dust Study); (2) 2008-5-I-GA-R11 (from Imperial Sugar report); (3) 2011-4-I-TN- and (4) 2011-4-I-TN-R2 (from Hoeganaes case study), and possibly other items at the discretion of the Chair.
This notice is to provide information to the public concerning the matters related to the seven recommendations to OSHA listed above, which will be considered during the meeting. At the meeting, the staff will present their evaluations of the implementation of these seven recommendations. Following the staff presentations in the morning and afternoon, the Board will hear brief statements from OSHA, interested stakeholders, and the public. The Board will consider these analyses and vote on the status to assign to each recommendation according to Board Order 22 [http://www.csb.gov/assets/Record/BO_22.pdf.].
In addition, at this meeting, the CSB will also consider the potential designation of a general industry standard for combustible dust as a "Most Wanted Chemical Safety Improvement" issue under Board Order 46 [http://www.csb.gov/assets/Record/Order_046_(06122012).pdf].
The following section contains summaries of the staff evaluations for the recommendations that will be presented to the Board for consideration.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Recommendation to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 2001-05-I-DE-1
Recommendation Text
Ensure coverage under the Process Safety Management Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) of atmospheric storage tanks that could be involved in a potential catastrophic release as a result of being interconnected to a covered process with 10,000 pounds of a flammable substance.
Rationale for Recommendation
The recommendation followed a fatal explosion involving a poorly maintained and corroded atmospheric aboveground tank containing spent sulfuric acid and flammable hydrocarbons at the Motiva Enterprises refinery in Delaware City in July 2001. The company considered the tank to be exempt from the OSHA Process Safety Management standard under the 1997 Meer decision. This decision was issued by an administrative law judge of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The decision, exempts from PSM coverage, "flammable liquids stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred which are kept below their normal boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigeration." The CSB Motiva investigation concluded that if Motiva had adhered to a PSM standard requirements for the tank, the accident could have been avoided.
Summary of OSHA Response to the Recommendation
OSHA does not agree that it is necessary to revise the PSM standard in order to clarify the issues of coverage of tanks connected to processes. As an alternative, OSHA reported to the CSB in 2003 that it would issue a revised PSM Compliance Directive that would clarify to all its compliance officers and to the regulated parties that tanks like the one at Motiva (which OSHA contended had a process function as well as a storage function) were covered under PSM. To date, however, OSHA has not revised its compliance directive. An August 2012 communication from the Assistant Secretary projected completion of a revision in 6-9 months, and the agency's Spring 2013 regulatory agenda indicates that it is considering "clarifying the PSM exception for atmospheric storage tanks" as part of a broader revision of its PSM standard, 29 CFR 1910.119.
Summary Evaluation
Because ten years have passed and OSHA has yet to take any regulatory or other actions which would address the intent of the recommendation, CSB staff propose that the Board vote to designate Recommendation 2001-5-I-DE-R1 with the status "Open-Unacceptable Response."
Recommendation to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 2005-04-I-TX-R9
Recommendation Text
Amend the OSHA PSM standard to require that a management of change (MOC) review be conducted for organizational changes that may impact process safety including:
(a) Major organizational changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or reorganizations;
(b) Personnel changes, including changes in staffing levels or staff experience; and
(c) Policy changes, such as budget cutting.
Rationale for Recommendation
The CSB investigation of the 2005 explosions and fire at the former BP refinery in Texas City, Texas revealed that poorly managed corporate mergers, leadership and organizational changes, and budget cuts increased the risk of catastrophic accidents at the site. The CSB also noted that a 2002 survey revealed that organizational change was assessed in the Management of Change (MOC) programs of only forty-four percent (44%) of chemical processing companies, strongly suggesting that assessment of such organizational factors are not widely used in the industry. While OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119) requires MOC analyses for changes to "process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures; and, changes to facilities that affect a covered process," the CSB concluded that it does not explicitly require that employers conduct MOC reviews for organizational, personnel and policy changes that could affect process safety. Consequently, the CSB recommended that OSHA amend the PSM standard to clarify that MOC reviews must be conducted for organizational, personnel, and policy changes that may impact process safety.
Summary of OSHA Response to the Recommendation
OSHA responded that the PSM standard already requires employers to develop and implement MOC reviews to determine the adequacy of all contemplated changes with respect to their safety and health impacts as they relate to "process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and facilities." In OSHA's view, these are the types of changes encompassed by the CSB recommendation. In addition, OSHA sent a memorandum to all Regional Administrators to clarify this policy with regard to the coverage of organizational changes under the PSM's management of change requirements. The policy clarification was to be provided to OSHA's compliance officers. OSHA's Spring 2013 regulatory agenda indicates that the agency is considering expanding the scope of its PSM standard to "require greater organizational management of change from employers."
Summary Evaluation
A policy memorandum to OSHA Regional Administrators is not the permanent regulatory change envisioned by the Board, which sought an explicit change in the requirements of the standard through through rulemaking procedures. For this reason, staff propose that the Board vote to designate Recommendation 2005-04-I-TX-R9 with the status: "Open—Unacceptable Response."
Please read on at: https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/07/12/2013-16838/sunshine-act-meeting
